


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Western Europe: Human Rights Policies

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An Intelligence Assessment

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EUR 83-10179X June 1983

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Human Rights Policies	

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An Intelligence Assessment

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European Issues Division, EURA,

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	Western Europe: Human Rights Policies 25.	X1
Key Judgments Information available as of 10 June 1983 was used in this report.	West European governments have long been interested in promoting respect for human rights, but their actions have frequently been less impressive than their rhetoric. The major West European countries generally have been reluctant to condemn or take punitive measures against countries in which they have substantial economic, security, and other interests. Left-leaning governments in the major countries have paid greater lipservice to the need for protecting human rights, but their expediency almost equals that of their conservative counterparts. In contrast to the generally pragmatic larger nations, the governments of 25)]
	some smaller countries—particularly in northern Europe—have played a more active role in the defense of wide-ranging human interests abroad. They also have electorates that are highly sensitive to human rights issues and leaders who aspire to be the "conscience" of Europe. Nevertheless, they, too, have often had to strike a balance between concern for human rights and practical national interests.	
	Because of their desire to maintain good state-to-state relations with offending countries, most West European governments prefer to deal with human rights abuses through international organizations such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Community. Even the larger West European nations have been more willing to speak out for human rights in these bodies, since multinational criticism of oppressive regimes tends to protect individual countries from retaliatory actions.	X 1
	While the governments of the major nations have initiated or supported resolutions condemning human rights practices in Poland, the Soviet Union, Iran, and South Africa, they have been careful to keep their disapproval limited. The European Community, for instance, has shown a deep reluctance to use its considerable economic power against human rights violators, except for its treatment of the Greek junta and the present military regime in Turkey. It has placed minor restrictions on imports from the USSR, but these have not been very costly to the Soviets or to EC members. The industrial nations have been even more circumspect toward South Africa and have not supported UN resolutions calling for comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against Pretoria for its apartheid policies.	X1

Because West European governments have to reconcile conflicting foreign policy interests, the chief defenders of human rights have been European-based nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International and the Socialist International. These organizations have fought the battle for international human rights with dedication and vigor.

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We believe that the combination of growing domestic and international pressures will prompt West European governments to give greater consideration to human rights issues in their foreign policy decisions. Increasingly, West European governments also may be forced to face the demands of the poorer nations of the world for assistance in strengthening their "economic" human rights by agreeing to legally binding transfers of economic resources. Although it is unlikely that West European countries will accept this principle, they may in the future show greater willingness to enlarge their development programs and to facilitate international bank loans to developing countries on more favorable terms.

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We believe that West European human rights policies toward the East generally will complement the US effort to hold the Soviet Union accountable for agreements made in the Helsinki Final Act. Most West European countries, however, will resist US efforts to press the human rights issue at the expense of detente and economic ties. In other areas, such as southern Africa and Turkey, the pragmatic and low-key approach of the major countries is more likely to complement US human rights policies and broader interests than the confrontational tactics of the smaller states and private groups. In the case of Central America, however, the US effort to balance political, strategic, and human rights concerns will find little sympathy except in London and possibly in Bonn.

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Human Rights: An Overview

West European interest in human rights is the outgrowth of a strong humanistic tradition. While the principles that underlie the modern concept of human rights are evident in classical Western philosophy and various world religions, the concept itself—involving fundamental freedoms that are a natural endowment of man and transcend the authority of the state—did not arise before the Enlightenment. Until World War I the major countries, except for imperial Russia, agreed that the advancement of human rights is a moral obligation of the state. The emergence of totalitarian regimes in Germany and Italy in the post—World War I period broke the consensus and led to massive violations of human rights before and during World War II.

In the aftermath of the war, West European countries emphasized the need not only for building and strengthening democratic values and institutions at home, but also for advancing them abroad. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was an expression of the Western desire to promote democratic principles throughout the world. The European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 was designed to safeguard human freedoms in Europe. It gave the Council of Europe the authority to hear and decide cases involving human rights violations in member states. More recently, the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 made the protection of human rights an integral part of East-West relations.

Development of an international human rights policy has presented West European governments with three principal problems. First, they have had to agree on a definition of human rights. Second, they have been

¹ In this paper the term "human rights" refers to individual rights and freedoms contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights, and the Helsinki Final Act. Human rights, as defined in these documents, include the right to life, liberty, and security of the person; protection from torture or cruel or degrading treatment; equality before the law and the right to a prompt and fair trial; freedom of thought, expression, conscience, and religion; and the right to human contact and information exchanges. In the present discussion, economic rights are treated as a separate category of human rights.

required to deal with the practical political problems of implementing a consistent human rights policy. Third, they have had to ponder how best to make that policy effective. Regarding the definition of human rights, West European governments have recognized the legitimacy of individual political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights by ratifying the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Human Rights Covenants. As signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, they reaffirmed not only their recognition of the "classical" human rights, but also accepted freedom of human contact and information exchanges as legitimate rights of man. Although West European governments have acknowledged economic and social rights in principle, they have treated them more as aspirations than as presently achievable entitlements. In their estimation, the realization of economic and social rights requires a level of economic development that many Third World countries have not yet reached.

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Thus far, West European governments have not recognized the "right to development," a demand by the poorer nations for a New International Economic Order. During discussions in the United Nations and the Council of Europe, West Europeans have supported the idea of development aid, but generally they have not been prepared to accept the right of less developed countries to economic transfers from advanced industrialized nations. West European countries have "justified" their opposition to the right to development by maintaining that human rights pertain to individuals and not to states. The right to development would be exercised by governments and might not always benefit individual citizens.

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While West European governments have proclaimed the protection of international human rights as an objective, most have not pursued a consistent human rights policy. Moreover, even when they have accorded more emphasis to human rights, West Europeans

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have often been at odds over whether they are more effectively pursued through "quiet diplomacy" or open advocacy. Both the issues of consistency and tactics were well illustrated by the West European reaction to the Carter administration's upgrading of human rights into a major, openly pursued foreign policy goal. Although the smaller countries took comfort in both US policy and its approach, the more pragmatic larger states remained unenthusiastic. This was especially true of West Germany, whose chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, frequently expressed his belief that the US approach was counterproductive and was endangering the progress made toward free movement of people between the two Germanies.

Although there clearly is a gap between the ideal and the reality of West European human rights policy, some governments have adhered more closely to moral principle than others. Moreover, even the most pragmatic governments have paid more attention to human rights when public opinion has demanded it. It is fair to say, however, that West European human rights policy—particularly that of the larger countries—has been shaped even more by economic, security, and other national interests

The Major Countries: The Primacy of Pragmatism

Generally, the major West European countries—West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and even the socialist government in France—have been reluctant to condemn or to take punitive measures against countries in which they have substantial economic, security, or other national interests. This has been particularly evident regarding violations in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The European Community imposed relatively minor restrictions on imports from the USSR after Poland declared martial law, but the major countries refused to support the more stringent US economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Moreover, they continued to deliver technologically advanced equipment for the Siberian-West European natural gas pipeline. We believe that even the minor European Community restrictions on Soviet imports may soon be removed. Various countries, including

the United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy, have questioned the efficacy of continuing these token economic measures in EC forums, citing the suspension of martial law last December to justify termination of the sanctions.

West European governments strive not only for a profitable trade relationship with the East Bloc, but also for detente. The review meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Madrid reflects the conflict among Western delegations between their concern for human rights and the wish for disarmament. Allied governments generally have agreed that observance of human rights by East Bloc countries is a prerequisite for detente.

During the first session of the current meeting, France also attached less importance to human rights than to detente. But during the second round, France adopted a harder line toward the Soviet Union in response to Moscow's stand in the INF talks in Geneva. Now that France is more certain about INF deployment, however, it is likely in our view to refocus its attention on detente and not push the Soviets as hard on human rights.

Pragmatism has also been the principal characteristic of the major countries' human rights policies in Latin America and Africa.

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The policies of the new center-right coalition in West Germany concerning Latin America are similar to	employees—more stringently than the current con- servative administration.	
those of the Tories. Chancellor Kohl has expressed a		25X6
desire to improve relations, which had deteriorated		^{25X}
after the Falklands invasion.		
	Although the major countries generally have played down the human rights violations of governments with which they need to maintain good relations, public opinion has sometimes forced them to take a stronger stand. Intense public interest in the fate of Italian nationals missing in Argentina, for example, caused the Italian Covernment to make strong protects to the	25X 25X
Although leftist governments have tended to be more critical of dictatorial regimes than their conservative counterparts, they have been selective in their criticism. The French Socialists, for instance, have condemned the human rights practices of military governments in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile, and have refused to follow the previous government's	the Italian Government to make strong protests to the Argentine regime despite Italy's big economic stake in that country. Italian parliamentarians went to Argentina to investigate the missing persons issue, and the Foreign Ministry made clear to Buenos Aires that future trade between the two countries will depend on Argentine progress toward democracy.	0.5
practice of selling arms to the Chileans. They have baid less attention, however, to human rights violations by leftist insurgent groups and by Marxist regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua. Moreover, the Mitterrand government has been conciliatory toward rightist dictators when political and economic necessity required it—France was the first country to resume arms sales to Argentina after the Falklands invasion. Mitterrand also has tried to stay on good terms with dictators in francophone Africa. He recently visited Gabon, and he gave Sekou Toure of Guinea a highevel official welcome during his state visit to France.	Public concern last winter also led the West German and British Governments to abandon their preference for quiet diplomacy and make demarches to the Soviet Union on behalf of Soviet dissidents Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly Shcharansky. According to a US Embassy source, the West German demarche on behalf of Sakharov was prompted by increasing public interest in the Sakharov case and activities of writers Heinrich Boell and Lev Kopelev. The British Foreign Ministry also publicized its protest on behalf of Shcharansky to demonstrate high-level government concern to his supporters. The Smaller Countries: Principle Over Pragmatism?	25)
ed a sense of <i>Realpolitik</i> not only with regard to the	The governments of the smaller countries, particular-	25)
East Bloc but with Latin America and Africa.	ly the Nordic and Benelux countries, have tended to	25)
	be more outspoken about human rights than the larger nations. Although the northern countries have paid little attention to human rights violations by leftist insurgent groups, they have been relatively evenhanded in their criticism of repressive govern-	25)
	ments. The Dutch Government, which has been in the	
	forefront of the human rights battle, placed principle above pragmatism in its reaction to the brutal politi-	25)
	cal murders in Suriname last December. The Hague	201
When in office, the British Labor Party observed the EC Code of Conduct for South Africa—which requires businesses operating in South Africa to report	cut off its \$150 million a year economic and military	

assistance program to the Bouterse regime despite substantial economic ties with the former Dutch colony. In addition, the Dutch Government has stated that it may revoke permission for Dutch nationals to work in the civilian and military sectors of the Surinamese Government unless Bouterse restores democracy.

The Belgian Government also recently showed greater concern for human rights than for economic advantage in its reaction to the jailing of parliamentarians in Zaire. It strongly condemned the Mobutu regime and postponed the Zairian President's planned visit to Belgium. The Scandinavian countries demonstrated concern for human rights as well by their official ban in 1978 of new investment in South Africa.

That these countries generally feel less constrained by their economic and other interests abroad than the larger nations only partially explains their great interest in human rights. They also have electorates, parliaments, and news media that have shown great sensitivity to human rights issues in former colonies and in places such as Greece, and, more recently, Turkey and Central America. In addition, they have political leaders—especially Sweden's Olof Palme and Austria's Bruno Kreisky—who aspire to be the conscience of Europe by being in the forefront of those championing human rights. The idealism of the Scandinavian and Benelux countries is reflected in their comparatively large foreign assistance programs. As a percentage of GNP, Dutch foreign assistance is twice as high as West Germany's and five times greater than that of Italy. Denmark and Sweden, too, have proportionally larger foreign aid programs than the major West European countries. The Nordic countries also have been very involved in helping refugees through the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. Moreover, Norway and Sweden have special programs for admitting handicapped refugees to their countries.

While the smaller northern European countries have demonstrated a genuine interest in human rights, they, too, have to balance multiple interests. The Danish Government and opposition parties, for instance, have strongly criticized the Polish military regime, but the parliament failed to renew European

Community import measures against the Soviet Union when the opposition parties refused to support the government's legislation. Concern about political repression in the Soviet Union also has not prevented Denmark from trying to obtain a multimillion dollar Soviet order for refrigerator ships. Although Sweden has denounced South African apartheid policy, it abstained in last year's UN General Assembly vote on a resolution calling for the Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa. Palme, however, who recently returned to power, has taken a tougher position. During a recent visit to Nigeria, Palme pleaded for compulsory UN sanctions against Pretoria.

Among the smaller southern European countries, Spain, because of its historical ties with Latin America, has been most vocal in espousing democratic initiatives there. Socialist Prime Minister Gonzalez has shown great interest in promoting political liberalization and has stated publicly that Spain's political evolution from fascism to democracy can provide a model for some Latin American countries. Despite concern for democracy in Latin America, Spain is not willing to seriously damage its relationship with Argentina. After initial hesitation, for instance, the Spanish Foreign Minister last February received the mothers of disappeared Argentines (mothers of La Plaza de Mayo).

The former conservative government of Portugal assumed a low-key approach to human rights. Although the Democratic Alliance expressed its support for human rights, it did not publicly criticize human rights violations in Latin America. It also made the protection of human rights a low priority of its African policy, in our judgment, because of the desire to establish a closer relationship with Portugal's former African colonies. The new government under Socialist Prime Minister Soares is likely to take a stronger stand on human rights. Soares has shown great interest in advancing the cause of human rights through the Socialist International. While Soares is

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likely to speak out for human rights in Latin America, he probably will show restraint in criticizing South Africa to protect Portugal's various interests there, including the welfare of Portuguese expatriates.

Greece continues to call international attention to violations of Greek Cypriots' human rights as a result of the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus, but otherwise, we believe, it has not gone out of its way to protest international human rights violations. The Socialist Papandreou government has usually forgone criticism of human rights abuses in the Eastern bloc, Cuba, and Nicaragua, partially because of its ideological affinity with leftist regimes.

The Role of International Organizations

West European governments generally prefer to deal with human rights violations through organizations, such as the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Community. One reason for this preference may be the belief that international condemnation of human rights violators is more effective than unilateral protest. A more important reason, in our judgment, is that international human rights resolutions tend to cause less damage to state-to-state relations.

In the United Nations even the larger West European states, which generally have been careful not to harm important bilateral relations, have initiated or supported human rights resolutions against countries in which they have considerable interests. For example, West Germany and Italy—along with the Netherlands and Denmark—sponsored a resolution against Poland in the Human Rights Commission, condemning the military regime's violation of fundamental freedoms and, by implication, Soviet complicity. West European countries—except for Finland—also voted in favor of resolutions in the General Assembly calling for withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. The same West European countries supported resolutions calling for an international investigation of the use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Laos, and Kampuchea, illustrating their concern that the Soviet Union may be responsible for the use of nerve gas in Afghanistan and of mycotoxins-which produce a deadly yellow rain-in Southeast Asia.

In the last two years West European governments also have supported resolutions in the Human Rights

Commission on Iran that expressed deep concern about summary and arbitrary executions by the

Khomeini regime. Some governments, however, have been careful not to overdo their criticism of Iran.

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Economic and political interests have dictated the West European vote on resolutions against South Africa and Israel. While West European governments have expressed public disapproval of Pretoria's racist policies, most have not supported General Assembly resolutions calling for the Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions. West Europeans not only are unwilling to significantly curtail their trade with South Africa; they also fear that economic sanctions may increase Pretoria's intransigence regarding a Namibian settlement. The major West European countries have also voted against resolutions protesting Israeli human rights practices in occupied Middle Eastern territories; the Scandinavian countries abstained.

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The Council of Europe and its Human Rights Commission also have provided a forum for the international advancement of human rights. The Council's Parliamentary Assembly has criticized human rights violations by Communist regimes as well as by rightist dictatorships. The Council of Europe, which has publicly embraced President Reagan's new policy of "democracy initiatives," plans to play host to a series of conferences in Strasbourg to strengthen and promote democratic government around the world. The initial conference this fall will bring together parliamentarians from industrial democracies, but subsequent meetings will also include Third World representatives.

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The Council's concern for political and civil liberties is reflected in its reaction to the jailing of political dissidents in Turkey. To protest the military regime's disregard of human rights, the Parliamentary Assembly is considering Turkey's expulsion from the Council of Europe. Although the Assembly expelled the Greek military regime in 1969, we believe it is not likely to make the same decision in the case of Turkey. West Germany and the United Kingdom, appreciating Turkey's strategic value, have resisted strong pressure in favor of expulsion by the Scandinavian countries, France, Spain, and Greece. These countries argue that a democratic community of states cannot accept an authoritarian regime among its members.

The European Community also has made efforts to further the cause of human rights. The European Parliament repeatedly has condemned Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Earlier this year it passed a resolution calling on the new Soviet leadership to facilitate Jewish emigration. Recently, the European Parliament denounced Soviet treatment of dissidents Anatoly Shcharansky and Andrei Sakharov and called attention to the internment of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians in Soviet labor camps. The European Parliament has also made demarches to the South African Government on behalf of African National Congress members awaiting execution.

Although the European Community is committed to the defense of international human rights in principle, it has been reluctant to use its considerable economic power against human rights violators. Members of the Common Market have tried to justify their preference for "business as usual" by arguing that trade sanctions, while hurting innocent people, usually do not lead repressive regimes to liberalize the political process.

In fact, the European Community has imposed economic sanctions against certain countries, but generally these measures have been mild and have not been implemented Community-wide. After the imposition of martial law in Poland, for instance, the EC restricted certain imports from Moscow. Less than 2 percent of Soviet exports to the European Community, however, were affected by this decision. Moreover, US

officials detected growing sentiment among some member states against continuing the minor import measures against the USSR. Denmark already has withdrawn its support.

Sanctions against Argentina—which were placed in response to the Argentine invasion of the Falklands and had only an indirect relationship to human rights issues—also lacked force. Import restrictions did not cover previously signed contracts and were terminated after less than two months. Italy and Ireland refused to suspend trade with Argentina even during the

course of the war.

Italy claimed that its

manufacturing sectors would be damaged if imports of leather and other goods were suddenly interrupted.

The EC, like the Council of Europe, has shown less hesitation to punish human rights violators closer to home. For instance, it cut off aid to Greece and froze its phased integration into the Community during the seven-year period of military rule that began in 1967. Since the end of 1981 the Common Market also has withheld \$650 million in aid to Turkey on human rights grounds. In both cases, EC toughness has owed to the belief that states that purport to be members of the West European democratic community must take special care to abide by its guiding principles.² Nonetheless, in the case of Turkey, the major EC countries have been careful not to go too far. Although the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reduced its total economic aid to Turkey for 1982, the major West European countries pledged approximately the same amounts as in the preceding year.

Nongovernmental Organizations: The Chief Defenders European-based nongovernmental organizations, such as Amnesty International (AI), the International Society for Human Rights, the Socialist International, 25X1

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² In the case of NATO and Spain, the Dutch for some time after Franco's death held up progress on Spain's application to join the Alliance because of doubts that the successor democratic system would last. They even opposed combined exercises with the Spanish, apparently out of fear that NATO's democratic credentials would be compromised.

and West European trade unions have been the chief West European defenders of human rights. Unlike governments, which are constrained by their need to reconcile competing interests, these organizations have made the protection of human rights a foremost goal.

London-based Amnesty International, the best known human rights organization, has focused its activities primarily on the rights of political prisoners. It seeks the release of people detained anywhere in the world for reasons of political belief, ethnic origin, or religious creed. The organization works for fair and prompt trials for political prisoners and tries to make sure that they are treated according to internationally recognized standards. AI appeals to the authorities holding individual prisoners and attempts to mobilize public and professional interest in their cases. In each of its monthly newsletters, AI describes the cases of three prisoners and asks its readers to send letters or telegrams to the responsible governments on their behalf. AI also mounts campaigns to publicize human rights violations that are not specific to one country. For instance, in 1981 the organization initiated a worldwide campaign to expose the use by governments of "disappearances" as a means of eliminating suspected opponents.

Since AI has consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council, it regularly submits information about human rights issues to various UN bodies, such as the Commission on Human Rights, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, and the Special Committee on Apartheid. It also has provided information to the standing committees of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly on the alleged use of torture in Turkey. West European governments have welcomed AI's activity in international organizations because its criticism of human rights violations cannot be attributed to them. We believe AI has been relatively evenhanded, highlighting in its reports human rights violations by leftist as well as rightist governments.

The Frankfurt-based International Society for Human Rights and the Copenhagen-based International Sakharov Committee have concentrated their activities on Eastern Europe. While West European governments have shown little interest in allegations about

Soviet use of forced labor on the Siberian-West European gas pipeline, the two human rights organizations investigated the issue last fall in a two-day hearing in Bonn. A 10-member panel, after hearing evidence from expert witnesses and former inmates of Soviet prisons, concluded that political prisoners are forced to work under extreme hardship.

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European trade unions, too, have long been active in the defense of international human rights. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which draws approximately half of its members from the European Trade Union Confederation, last year issued a statement condemning the blatant violation of human and trade union rights in South Africa. It also urged Western governments to try to isolate South Africa economically and politically. In contrast to some West European governments and parties, the ICFTU also has criticized the lack of political pluralism in Nicaragua.

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In West Germany, the German Trade Union Federation (DGB) last spring joined other free trade unions in condemning the Polish regime's suspension of Solidarity and its harassment of Solidarity members and their families. The DGB's president, along with some members of West Germany's Social Democratic—led government, had initially been reluctant to criticize the Jaruzelski regime too harshly, according to US Embassy officials, but pressure within his organization caused him to speak out more forcefully. On May Day 1982 he delivered a speech confirming DGB support for Solidarity.

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The Socialist International (SI) also has shown concern for human rights, but it has concentrated on abuses by rightist dictatorships and ignored many leftist human rights violations. In Europe, the SI publicized political repression by military regimes in Portugal, Spain, and Greece. More recently, the SI also has drawn attention to suppression of political opposition in Turkey. In general, the SI has made little noise about the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. Prompted by public outrage, however, it did issue a strongly worded statement condemning the Polish regime after the imposition of martial law.

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The SI's proleftist bias in the Third World has been particularly evident regarding human rights violations in Latin America. At its board meeting last fall in Basel, the SI passed a resolution condemning "state terrorism" in El Salvador and systematic extermination of the Indian population in Guatemala. Argentina and Uruguay received their share of criticism as well. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua, however, were only reminded of their original promises for political pluralism. Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba received no mention at all. Regarding human rights abuses in South Africa, the SI has not yet been able to reach a consensus on appropriate punitive measures against Pretoria. The European socialist parties, however, while denouncing apartheid, for the most part have opposed the demand by African Frontline States for an economic boycott of South Africa.

Prospects

We believe that the issue of human rights has become a permanent part of West European domestic and foreign policies. The question is not so much whether the West Europeans will take a stand on key human rights issues, but what that stand will be and how it will be manifested. In most instances, we expect that pragmatism and the belief that quiet diplomacy is most effective will guide West European actions. These, however, will be interspersed with a more idealistic and ideological approach that resorts to open confrontation with human rights offenders as the most effective way to curb their abuses.

The major West European countries, in our judgment, probably will continue to take a pragmatic and lowkey approach to the advancement of fundamental human rights abroad. Their reluctance to condemn or take unilateral punitive actions against countries with which they need to maintain good relations is not likely to change in the immediate future. They are likely to remain more willing to speak out for human rights in the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Community, particularly the European Parliament. Even there, however, they probably will continue to be careful not to take strong and concrete actions after voicing their disapproval. The European Community, for instance, is unlikely to display greater readiness to impose economic sanctions against human rights violators, particularly if such sanctions carry high political and economic

costs. The smaller countries, especially those in northern Europe, most likely will continue to be in the forefront of the battle for international human rights, but they also will be forced to strike a balance between concern for human rights and practical national interests.

We believe the chief defenders of human rights will continue to be European-based human rights organizations and other nongovernmental groups. Their published human rights reports, strong representations on behalf of political prisoners, and denunciations of oppressive regimes are likely to deepen the sensitivity of West European publics and their governments to human rights issues. Already, human rights questions have become common features on the agendas of several West European parliaments when issues such as Central America and southern Africa are discussed.

Thus far the West European countries have not followed the US example of legally tying economic and military assistance for recipient countries to their satisfactory human rights record, but this may change. Human rights is currently one of the factors examined in the parliamentary debates of some Scandinavian and Benelux countries when aid is considered and when they participate in international banks' decisions on loan applications. The European Parliament recently recommended that special trade arrangements for Third World countries under the Lome Convention should be made dependent upon human rights records. We believe legislation linking aid and favorable trade concessions to human rights records may gradually be adopted, perhaps first by some of the northern European countries.

In the future, West European governments in our view are likely to continue to place greater emphasis on political and civil rights, but they will come under growing pressure from the poorer nations of the world to agree to a more equitable international economic order. It is not likely that the West European governments will agree to make economic transfers a legally binding right of less developed countries. They may show greater willingness, however, to increase their discretionary development programs and to use their

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power in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to facilitate loans to developing countries on easier terms. As in the past, they are likely to make development aid and loans dependent on some measure of domestic economic reform.

Implications for the United States

Given the growing presence of human rights as a facet of national and international politics, West European human rights policies have important implications for US interests. With respect to human rights violations in the Soviet Bloc, West European attitudes, in our judgment, will generally complement the US effort to place the Soviets and their proxies on the defensive over their persistent disregard for the Helsinki accord. This is likely to be true not only of the smaller countries and private organizations, but also of the more pragmatic Big Four. Nonetheless, the West Europeans will remain wary of any US effort to push the human rights issue at the expense of what they view to be the more important imperatives of maintaining detente and profitable economic ties with the East.

The EC countries are not likely to restrict seriously their trade with the East to punish the Soviets for activities in Poland, Afghanistan, and Southeast Asia. The Big Four participants in the economic summit in Williamsburg sent strong signals to the United States that they would not welcome reintroduction of the issue of trade sanctions against Moscow.

West European policies in southern Africa are also broadly compatible with US policies and interests. Most West European countries, for example, remain opposed to economic sanctions against Pretoria. To be sure, the smaller countries and private West European groups continue to criticize South Africa's apartheid policies and its stance on Namibian independence. Moreover, the Belgians in some instances are likely to continue to be tougher with the Mobutu regime in Zaire than the United States would prefer. The major countries, however, particularly the United Kingdom and West Germany, prefer the current US approach that emphasizes quiet diplomacy both on the apartheid and Namibian issues.

Of the five Western contact-group members attempting to settle the Namibian issue, only the French have openly opposed the US effort to link a Namibian

settlement to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The Mitterrand government is undoubtedly doing so to mollify the Socialist Party's left wing, since in private it is in full agreement that the Cuban forces must go. Moreover, Mitterrand's continuation of the traditional French policy of remaining on good terms with Africa's francophone leaders may not be conducive to the advancement of human rights in some of those countries, but it has helped keep them in the Western fold.

Far more troublesome for the United States, in our judgment, are West European human rights policies in Central America. There the complexity of the issues and the absence of strong West European economic and security interests have prompted most West European countries to give priority to ideological concerns. France, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries, for instance, are likely to continue to complicate US objectives in Central America by focusing on the faults of the Salvadoran Government and the Nicaraguan insurgents, while taking a benign view of the Salvadoran insurgents and the Sandinista 25X1 regime in Managua. Even in Central America, however, there are points of convergence with US policy. The British and West German Governments remain sympathetic to the US's broad objectives, and most West European governments approve of San Salvador's call for early elections. 25X1

Within the Western orbit itself, the measured reaction of the major countries except France to the military regime in Turkey is similar to the US approach. The harsher overall West European response in the Council of Europe and the EC, however, places the West Europeans at odds with US policy. Although West European pressures may have prompted the generals to advance slightly their timetable for democratization, they have also added to Turkish resentment of the West Europeans. This will complicate US efforts to keep Turkey firmly tied to the West. It may also mean that the United States will have to bear a greater share of the burden of Turkey's economic reconstruction—particularly if the new experiment in democratic rule founders.

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